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Abstract: Sustainability is commonly recognized as an important goal, but there is little agreement on what sustainability is, or what it
requires. This paper looks at some common approaches to sustainability, and while acknowledging the ways in which they are useful, points
out an important lacuna: that for something to be sustainable, people must be willing to work to sustain it. The paper presents a framework for
thinking about and assessing sustainability which highlights people working to sustain. It also briefly discusses Integrated Water Resource
Management and the example of the California Water Plan to explore what such a perspective brings that is overlooked in other approaches,
and how this approach might be pursued. Ultimately, this framework argues that a system can only be described as sustainable if
people’s work to sustain the system is biophysically possible, socially possible, and if people would freely choose to do the sustaining
work. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)WR.1943-5452.0000526. © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: Sustainability; Brundtland report; Social justice; Environmental values; Integrated water resource management;
California water plan.
Introduction
Sustainability is already an important goal for many projects, from
international development to architectural plans, yet the term itself
has different definitions, frameworks, and models (e.g., Altieri
1987; Brundtland 1987; Douglas 1984; Norton 2005; Ott 2003;
Seghezzo 2009; Thompson 1992, 2010; Williams and Millington
2004). However, this might not be as problematic as it first appears.
A vague, alterable goal like sustainability can act as a boundary
object, with a meaning that can shift based on context and expe-
rience while having an infrastructure of values and norms. A broad
goal can be open to the different perspectives and needs of the
people using it, crucially bringing together expert and nonexpert
efforts and knowledge (Robinson 2004; Star and Griesemer 1989;
Trompette and Vinck 2009). In that spirit, this paper does not at-
tempt to offer a fixed, immutable definition of sustainability.
Rather, it will offer a way of looking at sustainability that pulls
out some important but under-examined features, and which soft-
ens some of the tensions that have emerged between different
approaches to sustainability.
“Sustainabilities” will briefly look at a few key approaches to
sustainability and point out some of the tensions within and
between them, and the scales at which they are most appropriate.
“Elements of a Framework for Sustainability” will lay out a new
framework for thinking about sustainability, which focuses on the
people working to sustain a system. “Sustainability and Integrated
Water Resource Management”will discuss the relationship between
sustainability as viewed in this new framework and integrated water
resource management (IWRM), looking at the California Water
Plan as an example of the possibilities and problems of IWRM.
Ultimately this paper will argue that when focusing on people
working to sustain something, one sees the importance of a wide
variety of considerations which have been previously under-
examined in the literature on sustainability.
Sustainabilities
Approaches to and definitions of sustainability can disagree widely,
and are often applicable in very different temporal and spatial
scales. However, they usually share an under appreciation of the
necessary activity of people to sustain something, which is the fo-
cus of this paper. Thus, a few illustrative examples of dominant
approaches to sustainability will need to suffice to cover the vast
literature of definitions or frameworks. This should not be seen as
an exhaustive list.
One prominent version of sustainability is the triple model of
three pillars or circles of sustainability—economic, social, and
ecological. The simplest triple model conceives of sustainability
as resting upon three pillars—environmental, social, and economic
factors—with each pillar supporting the sustainability of the society
they undergird (Dawe and Ryan 2003). Because this model of sus-
tainability does not suggest interconnections between the three
components, multiple circle-based versions have become common
(Lozano 2008). The overlapping circle or Venn diagram version of
sustainability depicts areas of overlap between the environmental,
social, and economic components, with sustainability achieved in
the area of the Venn diagram where all components overlap. The
three concentric circle model, where the economy is nested within
the social system, and the social system within the environment,
emphasizes the subsumption of some components within others
(Flint and Houser 2001). It is not an entirely settled question as
to who first used this triple model, but a likely possibility is that
it was first used in a Venn diagram by Miguel Altieri (1987) in his
book Agroecology: The scientific basis of sustainable agriculture.
In that book, he cites Gordon K. Douglas (1984) and his book
Agricultural sustainability in a changing world order. Douglas lays
out three different themes of agricultural sustainability that came
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out of the work of the contributors to that book, which he identified
as food sufficiency, ecological integrity, and social sustainability.
The last term referred to the assault on vibrant rural communities
some contributors to Douglas’s book saw coming from industrial
agriculture (pp. 3–30).
If Altieri (1987) was inspired by these divisions, his three circles
are more problematic than Douglas’s three areas, not least because
they model sustainability generally, rather than the sustainability of
agricultural production. It is widely acknowledged that sustainabil-
ity can be analyzed at multiple scales, but if these three pillars are
universalized, they become confusing at the widest scales. For
example, if the economy is not taken to be something fixed and
external to the system in question, but rather as part of the system
whose sustainability is being assessed, it is unclear why the
economy should be its own pillar rather than a subset of social sus-
tainability, or perhaps the overlap of society and ecology. What
does economic sustainability, as opposed to social sustainability,
indicate in ancient Egyptian slave agriculture, when labor is com-
manded rather than purchased (Thompson 1992)? It is also the
case, of course, that this framework only points to different kinds
of sustainability, rather than offering a definition itself. Given that
limitation and the questions above, it seems that the best use of this
triple model is to draw attention to several important areas that
might otherwise be neglected, for the purposes of evaluating a par-
ticular institution or other entity within a relatively fixed societal
background. Indeed, this framework is often used to urge people
to consider not only economic sustainability, but social and eco-
logical sustainability as well, something which conversations about
systems often fail to do (Pintér et al. 2008).
Another common conception of sustainability comes from the
Brundtland Report, also known as Our Common Future, which has
become very widely cited and discussed in sustainable development.
The Brundtland Report’s definition of sustainable development is
“Development that meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”
(Brundtland 1987). This definition of sustainable development
seems to point to sustainability simpliciter as meeting present needs
without degrading future capacities for meeting needs. This defi-
nition can be, and indeed often is, used with the three pillars of
sustainability above, to provide a definition of sustainability within
each pillar, or to show how some pillar (usually the environment)
constrains other pillars (usually the economy).
However, this definition too has some problems. One is in the
problem of what needs are and what it indicates to either meet them
now or compromise meeting them for future generations. The
Brundtland Report recommends growing industrial production five
to 10 times over contemporary levels to meet the needs of the world,
which leaves it open to critiques that it sees industrial economic
growth as a need. Critics object that this growth is impossible to
sustain indefinitely, which would render the report’s definition
of sustainability impossible to achieve (see e.g., Robinson 2004
for a discussion of this objection). Further, it is not clear how
the Brundtland Report’s version of sustainability would allow us
to ever use any amount of nonrenewable resources, because any
rate of consumption would compromise the ability of a future gen-
eration sufficiently distant to meet its needs, unless one is commit-
ted to the idea that something can be used in a way that looks
unsustainable now, but is at a rate “such that they will not be ex-
hausted before alternative sources are available” (Rijsberman and
van de Ven 2000). In such cases one can accept that alternatives will
be discovered in the future, and assume some rate of discovery. If
sustainability is to mean anything, this anticipation of discoveries
must be based on a communally justified reason (because other-
wise people could say any practice was sustainable by asserting
that alternatives and solutions would be developed in the future).
However, if there are people who do not consent to these reasons,
particularly if they will be affected by exhausting those resources,
then continuing to rely on those assumptions is deeply problematic
on justice grounds.
Another problem with the Brundtland Report is that to not com-
promise the ability of future generations to meet their needs, one
has to know what those needs will be. This is because making any
choice now constrains future choices, in that some possible futures
are foreclosed, some made less probable, some made more prob-
able, and some aspects of the future made (at least fairly) certain.
Unfortunately, it is not always possible to know if the foreclosed
possibilities were ones that future generations needed. One solution
to this, favored in adaptive management, is to try to make decisions
that leave as many choices in the future open as possible (e.g., Norton
2005), but maximizing alternatives may well require foreclosing the
most desirable alternatives. Another approach is to define needs
narrowly enough that one can be sure future generations will have
needs much like our own (e.g., the need for breathable air), but that
does not have the same robust normativity for which Brundtland
argues. Because of these problems and the assumptions built into
the definition itself (e.g., its intrumentalization of the natural world
as resources for meeting human needs), it seems that the best use of
this model is to point at the need for thinking intergenerationally on
the one hand, and to see sustainability as a commitment to distribu-
tive justice for all humans now on the other. It also seems aimed at
evaluating policies, especially international policies of develop-
ment, which is not surprising given the purpose of the commission.
A third conception of sustainability distinguishes between sys-
temic sustainability and goal-directed sustainability. Paul Thompson
(1992), in The varieties of sustainability, distinguishes between two
importantly different ways that sustainability is used in mainstream
and specialist discourse. Sustainability, as a system-describing con-
cept, asks whether a system, with defined boundaries and assumed
regularity of external inputs and ability to expel waste, can continue
over a specified time scale, or whether internal interactions will
disrupt the system (with disruptions being defined as events in
which characteristics of the system exceed upper or lower bounds
that are predetermined). What one might call systemic sustainabil-
ity is useful because whether or not a system will fall apart because
of internal processes is an important question. It also matches some
of our intuitions, in that it seems odd to say that agroecology is
unsustainable because the sun will consume the Earth in millions
of years; one tends to feel that this “shouldn’t count,” which
Thompson (1992) would say is because it is outside of our defined
limits to the system in question.
Of course, systemic sustainability does not cover many of the
ways that the term sustainability is used in contemporary dis-
course, and so Thompson also introduces sustainability as a goal-
describing concept. As Thompson (1992) points out, slavery-based
Egyptian agriculture was apparently quite a systemically sustain-
able form of agriculture, but if this is all sustainability indicates,
it seems to undercut arguments for sustainability as a moral obliga-
tion (e.g., Howarth 2007). In fact, if it is the case that these slaves
would have been better off if the system keeping them oppressed had
collapsed, allowing them to flee (as is at least possible), then it seems
that systemic sustainability is insufficient for just or moral systems.
If sustainability is instead a goal to be pursued as part of an
ethical approach to the system, Thompson (1992) points out there
are two ways that this could be the case. The first is that sustain-
ability could be bolted on, in that one only pursues sustainability
for systems one judges to be good or just (as happens in various
accounts of sustainability, e.g., Swyngedouw et al. 2002). Indeed,
Thompson (1992) argues that people should probably prefer a
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world that is less sustainable but more just and full of happy people
to a very systemically sustainable but oppressive world full of mis-
erable people. The second is that sustainability could inherently
require justice, making it a good goal to pursue in part because it
achieves justice, but Thompson (1992) says that he does not see any
way this could be the case without cherry-picking our criteria for
sustainability (our novel approach, covered in the next section, will
attempt in part to do this without unjustified cherry-picking).
This framework does not provide any easy answers to where one
should draw the boundaries around a system to speak of its sys-
temic sustainability, nor what time scales one ought to use. Bryan
Norton (2005) offers an excellent overview of why boundary-
drawing decisions are necessarily normative rather than purely sci-
entific; in short, human communities construct systems depending
on the dynamic relationships implicated in human communities’
pursuits of what they value. As people better understand how these
dynamic relationships are interrelated, they come to understand
how the pursuits of particular goals bear on the pursuits of other
goals. It is easy to focus on these interrelationships and set aside
the values that inform the founding inquiry, but those values must
always also be subject to deliberative scrutiny—a science devel-
oped to respond to particular values cannot itself show the impos-
sibility of very different values and starting points. Hence, systemic
sustainability gives limited guidance on what normative standards
ought to be included within goal-directed sustainability, and so both
systemic and goal-directed sustainability do not provide much in
the way of normative guidance when evaluating a system. There-
fore, this framework seems to be most useful when describing sys-
tems with fairly obvious borders, at least for the purposes of the
people defining the system, and one whose desirability is also
not in dispute for those assessing sustainability. That the difference
was initially applied to the sustainability of providing food to peo-
ple through agriculture is therefore appropriate.
Elements of a Framework for Sustainability
This section will lay out the beginning of an alternative framework
for sustainability, one that assesses sustainability by looking at
people’s ability to sustain the system in question (for ease of refer-
ence the authors will refer to systems, but it should be understood
that this framework applies to anything from a building to the total
of all agricultural practices of a society). The framework is only
partial, and so leaves sustainability open enough to serve as a boun-
dary object for future discussion, but it highlights some important
qualities of sustainability which ought to be taken into considera-
tion in any more comprehensive definition. The three conceptions
of sustainability above, and many other conceptions besides, do not
sufficiently address a key component of sustainability – people’s
ability to sustain a system, or an element of that system. Of course,
it is now necessary to define sustain, or to risk simply pushing the
vagueness back one step. The expression working to sustain most
generally refers to the practices that reproduce a way of life. Com-
munities coordinate these practices through a diversity of means,
which have been elaborated as community continuance (Whyte
2013) self-organized community viability (Werkheiser 2014), or
environmental heritage (Figueroa 2001). Though they are not iden-
tical concepts, all refer to members of a community’s ability to con-
tinue the elements of their ways of life and institutions they see as
important within and between generations, and to change or aban-
don other elements of their community as they decide in participa-
torily just ways. So sustaining a system, on this definition, indicates
both maintaining and changing its elements such that the system as
defined by that community is continued into the future.
This focus on people working to sustain something implies three
important requirements for calling something sustainable, based on
how people conceive of the agents and the world in which they do
their sustaining work. Briefly, according to the framework devel-
oped below, a system should only be described as sustainable if
people’s work to sustain the system is biophysically possible, so-
cially possible, and if people would freely choose to do the sus-
taining work.
If one thinks of people as biophysical bodies doing their work to
sustain a system in a biophysical world, then a necessary require-
ment for something being sustainable emerges: people’s work to
sustain a system must be biophysically possible. To say that com-
munities are situated in biophysical environments is simply to say
that they depend on inputs from those environments and must off-
load waste onto those environments. This view of the relationship
calls attention to the boundary between the environment and the
human system nested within, and when exchanges across this
boundary fall out of balance, a metabolic rift risks environmental
crises (Foster 1999). A practice which degrades the environment on
which it depends cannot be sustained over time no matter how hard
people work. Further, the agents themselves are biophysical beings,
and work to sustain a system must be possible for them to do as
well. If a system can only be sustained as long as people work at an
unsustainable rate, it will inevitably collapse. For example, if the
system in question is the one providing nutrition to those who sus-
tain it, it must produce at least enough calories expended to sustain
it plus those required to keep the people doing the work alive. Of
course, biophysical realities can change over time, and be changed
with technology to make particular sustainability work effective.
Thus, this requirement can refer to a particular time-scale, and can
also help guide work to make something sustainable, by showing
what changes would need to happen in order for sustaining work to
become biophysically possible.
A second requirement emerges when one thinks of people as
social beings working to sustain a system in a social world: peo-
ple’s work to sustain a system must be socially possible. At a nar-
row scale, this requirement can be applied to a particular system
operating within a social world, and in such case, the realities
of that social world must render it possible for some sustaining
work to succeed. For example, if people are working within our
current system and thinking about the sustainability of something
like a business, then asking about whether it makes enough money
to cover its expenses (what might be called economic sustainability
in the triple framework) makes sense, because the institutions in our
society obviate efforts to sustain businesses which lose too much
money every year. Likewise, it may be impossible to sustain a sys-
tem which runs afoul of too many laws, or which is out of step with
social preferences and common wisdom. It is important not to think
of this requirement as always setting smaller systems against the
backdrop of the larger society’s institutions. Sometimes the reverse
is true, and the efforts of large social institutions are constrained by
local systems. For example, work to scientifically restructure local
community practices by distant central planners is often impossible
to sustain because the institution of the state is unable to make sense
of or see local social realities which resist this intrusion (Scott 1999).
At the widest scale, an entire society and all its institutions can be
evaluated to see if it meets this requirement. In this case, there would
still be a background of social institutions of other societies (and
international institutions). However, more focus would be placed on
the internal workings of the society’s institutions to evaluate if they
work together in a way that promotes functional integrity or not, as in
the systemic sustainability discussed in the previous section.
This requirement also includes looking at the social beings
engaged in the work of sustaining the system. For example, if they
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do not have the capacities (such as education, sufficient time to
devote to the project, and others besides) to sustain the system,
no amount of effort on their part will be successful until those
capacities have been built up (Chaskin 2001; Swyngedouw et al.
2002). Likewise, the ways that people have been shaped as social
beings by their social institutions (e.g., in their preferences) will
affect what work they do to sustain something, how committed they
are to the work, and so on, all of which can render work to sustain a
system socially possible or impossible.
As with the first requirement, the second requirement admits to
change in circumstances. In this case, however, that change is not
effected by technologies of environmental integration and altera-
tion. Rather, the change in both the social actors and the social sys-
tems come from changes in social conventions and institutions. For
example, a vibrant ecology of native species can be much easier to
sustain in the long term if religious or spiritual institutions are
changed to construct the practices of environmental restoration and
maintenance as a spiritual practice (Van Wieren 2013).
A third requirement for sustainability in this framework emerges
when one conceives of people as autonomous reasoners who have
and perhaps require justification for their work to sustain a system:
it must be the case that people would freely choose to do the sus-
taining work if given reasons. On purely practical grounds, merely
relying on coercive social institutions to get people to do the work
of sustaining a system is a much less secure kind of sustainability
than one based additionally on good reasons acceptable to all
parties. This is most obvious, perhaps, in the case of intergenera-
tional sustainability – if society wants multiple generations, of
which the current one is not a part, to continue a project, it is helpful
if that project is justifiable with good reasons and values (Dan Steel,
personal communication, 2014. For an interesting discussion of
intergenerational justifiability, see Steel 2015). To a certain extent,
people create future generations of society’s own community, and
thus have some control over the values of future generations and
what collectively counts as a good reason, but counting on the abil-
ity to shape future generations with faulty or otherwise insufficient
justification is unlikely to be successful. The same is true when
society expects anyone else in our current generation to engage
in a project, be they citizens from other nations being asked to par-
ticipate in a climate change regulation scheme, or people working
to sustain a particular building by keeping it hooked up to water
and power.
This requirement necessitates thinking about justice. First, giv-
ing reasons for people to choose an action is itself more procedur-
ally just than coercing people into action. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, reasons are often based on justice. A good reason
to choose to engage in work to sustain something is that one par-
ticipated in the decision-making process of defining the system and
the work required to sustain it, so this requirement pushes toward
participatory justice. Another good reason to choose to engage in
work to sustain a system is that the system fairly distributes costs
and benefits, so this requirement pushes toward distributive justice.
Finally, people are more likely to accept reasons which recognize
the uniqueness and importance of their perspective and cultural
way of life, so this requirement pushes us toward recognition
justice as well (Figueroa 2001; Shrader-Frechette 1991).
Like the first two requirements, this third requirement admits to
change. In this case, the change is in what reasons members of the
community accept. To pick one example, whether certain kinds of
justice appeals have uptake (such as the increasing importance of
recognition justice) can indeed change over time. The mechanisms
for this change are neither the technologies of the first requirement
nor the institutions of the second, but deliberative processes of rea-
son exchange, consciousness raising, and so on.
This third requirement, that a system is sustainable only if the
requisite work to sustain that system would be freely chosen by
community members, also avoids the objection that justice is per-
haps a cherry-picked criterion for sustainability (Thompson 1992).
According to this objection, requiring that people choose this work
is superfluous to whether the system is indeed sustainable; once the
system is shown to meet the first and second requirements, society
has demonstrated that the system is indeed sustainable, and shifting
to the third requirement amounts to a shift to separate values con-
strained by the first and second requirements. The crux of the mat-
ter is whether the third requirement is in fact a requirement, and
whether it is uniquely oriented to justice.
Our view is that all accounts of sustainability must consider
human action; human action is the background against which a sys-
tem is constructed, and human action is the foreground of work that
sustains the system as constructed. If all accounts of sustainability
do consider human action, then all accounts must imply a theory of
human action, or simply an understanding of how and why com-
munity members are moved to act. One can imagine a whole range
of possible theories of human action drawing from the myriad so-
cial sciences that participate in sustainability studies. Economists
might understand action to be responsive to incentives; sociologists
might understand action to be responsive to social norms and cus-
toms. The third requirement offers a humanist orientation to the
understanding of human action—human action is properly under-
stood as the sharing and considering of reasons, by which a com-
munity member chooses a course forward. Notice that, because it is
being offered as an alternative to more mechanistic understandings
of human action, this humanist understanding is not an additional
criterion. Further, this understanding constrains inquiry according
to a minimum commitment to justice. In effect, people face a choice
about what understanding of human action will undergird their
understanding of sustainability, and some choices are more just
than others. It is no more cherry-picking when the humanist theory
of human action is adopted than when an economic or sociological
theory is chosen. The understanding of sustainability is necessarily
incomplete until such a choice is made.
Although these three requirements for sustainability emerge
when conceiving of people and the world in which they sustain
something differently, they are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they
are seen as three separate constraints on what people will work to
sustain. These constraints cut across the different models of sustain-
ability discussed in the previous section. Elements of the environ-
mental sustainability tier are contained within the biophysical
requirement, but the biophysical requirement also addresses things
like the laws of physics and our biophysical bodies, which environ-
mental sustainability has not traditionally emphasized. The social
and autonomy requirements cut across the social and economic
pillars, in that certain questions germane to those pillars can be
thought of as being part of either of the requirements. Looking
at people doing work to sustain a system also gives a grounding
for when and why those pillars might be relevant concerns, as op-
posed to simply asserting them as some presentations of that model
do without, for example, explaining why it does not include a
fourth pillar—geological sustainability perhaps, or cultural sustain-
ability (e.g., Hawkes 2001).
The concerns motivating the Brundtland Report’s definition in-
volves biophysical and social constraints on what needs are present
now or will be in the future and how people might meet them. It
also involves one element of giving reasons, in that people should
work toward sustaining a system because they are trying to meet the
needs of this generation, though the autonomy requirement includes
other justice concerns in it besides. By focusing on people doing
work to sustain over time, our approach emphasizes discussion of
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continuing projects into the future, rather than thinking about future
generations only as a limiting factor on the way in which society
satisfies its current needs as is the case in some understandings of
the Brundtland Report.
This focus on people acting to sustain within a set of constraints
also covers much of the concerns of systemic sustainability in the
first two requirements, but considers those constraints as issuing
from the particular problems felt by the sustaining community. The
sustainability of the nitrogen cycle, or the sustainability of certain
financial practices, become challenges only insofar as the commu-
nity embarks on practices that encounter these constraints. It also,
as discussed above, sees sustainability to be inherently involved in
questions of justice, welfare, and so on in the third requirement,
thereby avoiding the problems in goal-based sustainability.
This framework also differs from some models of sustainability
by taking seriously the agency of people involved in the system.
Although it is certainly possible to give due weight to the individual
and collective actions of people in an analysis of socioecological
systems, they are often underappreciated in terms of their effects.
The problem stems from certain conceptions of sustainability,
which emphasize the resilience of the sustainable system and com-
monly highlight total systems in a way that takes human actions as
not particularly directed at sustaining that system (Holling 1973;
Lebel et al. 2006; Rockström et al. 2014; Walker et al. 2004). For
example, when socioecological systems are represented as having
particular ecological constraints (e.g., Lebel et al. 2006; Walker
et al. 2004), more attention should be paid to why those particular
ecological constraints are significant given the social practices that
interface with the environment. A meadow is at the bottom of a
basin of attraction for some ecosystems, but monocropped corn, or
English rose gardens, despite requiring much more input and effort,
are more sustainable if those system states are ones that people can,
and have good reasons, to sustain.
Sustainability and Integrated Water Resource
Management
The difficulties that arise when trying to achieve sustainability have
been recognized by many in water resource management literature
and practice as necessitating an adaptive approach. This approach is
usually called integrated water resource management (IWRM), and
it, like our framework above, takes seriously the importance of peo-
ple working to sustain a system. Thus, it is useful in this section to
show how IWRM fits in with this framework of sustainability.
IWRM has many different definitions, but perhaps the most
prominent is provided by the global water partnership (GWP),
which defines IWRM as “A process that promotes the coordinated
development and management of water, land, and related resources
to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equi-
table manner without compromising the sustainability of vital eco-
systems” (Agrawal et al. 2000). This conception of IWRM is often
described as being an essential part of sustainable development
along the lines of the Brundtland Report, such as in the American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) criteria
for sustainability of water resources systems as enabling social
goals while preserving the integrity of the water resource systems
into the foreseeable future (ASCE and UNESCO 1998). IWRM has
also been seen as a way of better integrating the three aspects of the
triple model of sustainability, by addressing the bias toward eco-
nomic sustainability and better acknowledging the importance and
interdependence of social and environmental sustainability ques-
tions (e.g., Davis 2007). IWRM pursues these goals of integration
and sustainable development with an explicit commitment to social
justice, including just distribution of benefits, risks, and harms, and
just participation by affected stakeholders (Agrawal et al. 2000).
The goals of IWRM then are what Thompson might call goal-
directed sustainability.
It is useful to briefly examine an example of IWRM in practice
before placing it in relation to our framework for sustainability.
California has complex, overlapping water laws, policies, and prac-
tices. To manage this, the state legislature introduced a mandate to
construct an overarching California Water Plan (CWP), adminis-
tered by the California Department of Water Resources (CDWR)
which acts as a collaborative facilitator for stakeholders in public
constituencies, different governmental agencies, and scientific
bodies to publicly create and adapt the CWP every five years
(California Department of Water Resources 2014a). The CWP does
not legally mandate actions, but is designed to be a “Collaborative
planning framework : : : [which] meets California Water Code re-
quirements; guides State investments in innovation and infrastruc-
ture; and advances integrated water management and sustainable
outcomes” (California Department of Water Resources 2014b). The
CDWR, through the CWP, also works to build up communities’
capacities to understand and adapt their water resources. To that
end, the CWP has recently called for local water plans and mea-
surements of sustainability throughout California, to better inte-
grate local stakeholders (Shilling et al. 2011). As Davis (2007)
points out, though the CWP is a powerful model of IWRM,
California still suffers serious water unsustainability despite this
plan attributable to powerful actors, legacies from previous practi-
ces, and environmental problems, and perhaps because of the
United States’ larger orientation of “net economic development as
the primary objective, while complying with the established envi-
ronmental laws” (p. 441).
IWRM is a particular framework for developing practices
(e.g., those found in Hooper 2006) to achieve the kind of co-
ordination of people to achieve sustainability, as laid out in any
of the dominant conceptions of that term. Because IWRM begins
with deliberation among the people who will need to work to sus-
tain the system, it includes the deliberative conceptualization of the
system that will be sustained. Because this system has been con-
ceptualized by reference to what matters to the community, IWRM
already takes seriously our third requirement that people would
choose to partake in the sustaining of that system. The physical
and social constraints that jeopardize this sustainability are identi-
fied according to the very values that motivate individuals to con-
ceptualize the system as facing those constraints. The crucial point
is that, when IWRM is successful, just participation precedes
the identification of shared sustainability challenges, and the co-
ordination of social actions that address these challenges.
Stressing the ways that participation bears on the conceptuali-
zation, investigation, and implementation of sustainable manage-
ment as our framework does helps to clarify two of the main
problems that IWRM faces in practice. The first main problem
IWRM policies have encountered is the difficulties and complex-
ities that can arise when expanding IWRM to incorporate larger
society (Biswas 2004). At the largest scale, it becomes unwieldy
to integrate and coordinate all the various institutions and other
actors. In the case of California, the problems of producing a single
water plan are what motivated the smaller, community-based plans
(Shilling et al. 2011), but there remains the larger problem of fitting
the CWP into the national landscape. From the perspective of this
paper’s framework of sustainability, these difficulties reflect social
sustainability and justice-based constraints. If the larger society is
considered external to the community that deliberates as part of
IWRM, then this smaller community faces a social sustainability
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challenge. In that case, the deliberating community must work to
reform the social institutions that give rise to the tension between
the community’s goals and the social actions of the larger society.
However, this tension might also be symptomatic of a failure to
justly include members of the larger society in the planning pro-
cess, and additionally the goals of the smaller community are sim-
ply misaligned with the goals of others. In such a case, the failure
could be resolved through broader deliberation that brings the
larger society together in pursuing a shared goal, a shared goal that
sufficiently motivates sustaining even at larger scales.
The second major obstacle to implementing IWRM is the costs
it imposes on some people and institutions, often those that benefit
most from the status quo, and so currently have power to undermine
efforts to promote IWRM. Again, this tension can be considered as
arising from external social sustainability constraints or justice-
based constraints. As IWRM researchers have pointed out, any
IWRM program must demonstrate that it can benefit people, and
that those negatively affected by the new system will have their
concerns addressed and perhaps their losses compensated
(e.g., Ballweber 2006; Davis 2007; Howe 2005). Here though,
IWRM must be realistic about the social possibility of different
ways of organizing society. Even if the larger society was fully in-
cluded in articulating the sustainability goals, this deliberation may
have settled on competing goals that cannot be simultaneously
achieved in practice. For instance, if deliberation esteems unfet-
tered accumulation of wealth plus extensive democratic control
of resources, it is being unrealistic about how institutions that en-
able both values will stand in tension. Even though justice concerns
are necessarily pertinent to conceptualizing a sustainable system,
ensuring just participation is not sufficient for achieving sustain-
ability. Inquiry into the social and biophysical constraints that im-
pair the actualization of the system must still be resolved.
If one takes seriously the role of people working to sustain a
system, IWRM provides a useful framework for coordinating this
work and perhaps convincing people to engage in it. At the same
time, this focus on people’s work for sustainability has the potential
to make explicit the necessary conditions for IWRM to succeed,
and thus to inform early strategies by IWRM coordinators.
Conclusion
The framework presented in this paper, by focusing on people, their
bodies, values, motivations, participation, reasons, and the worlds
in which they live, brings in a wider variety of considerations than
has been typical in assessments of sustainability in the past.
Because of the complexity of the problems facing our society and
ecosystem arising out of unsustainable practices, this variety of
voices may be a strong argument in its favor. As the above con-
versation on IWRM shows, there are many resources already in
place which can be used to pursue this kind of sustainability,
and this framework can likewise improve those efforts as an impor-
tant step in achieving sustainability in practice.
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